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MS. FEINSTEIN:

I’m really thrilled to be

moderating this panel, although I don’t think the
moderating job will be much work.

I could really just

say “interesting topics in merger enforcement,

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

2

discuss” and this group could probably go for half a
day.

But I’ll try to keep it a little organized.
Let me first start with the introductions.

To my far left is Howard Shelanski of Davis Polk and
Georgetown University Law School.

Next to him from

the European Union is Carles Esteva Mosso, who is the
Deputy Director General at the EU Commission.

Next to

me is Bruce Hoffman, the Director of the Bureau of
Competition at the FTC.

To my right is John Davies, a

Partner at Freshfields.
We are going to start off with a variety of
topics.

We’ll try to leave a little bit of time at

the end for questions.
Bruce, let me start with you.

Cases are

often brought on unilateral effects and there have
been questions about whether or not there has been a
resurgence in coordinated action theories in merger
enforcement.

Did it ever really go away?

I wonder

what your perspective is on how often that coordinated
interaction arises in cases in the United States.
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MR. HOFFMAN:

Thanks, Debbie.

Let me start

by saying a couple of things.
First I’ll give the standard disclaimer that
anything I say doesn’t necessarily reflect the view of
the Commission or any Commissioner or the Bureau of
Competition or anybody.
I also wanted to note, following up on
Commissioner Ohlhausen’s talk a few minutes ago, I
want to thank her for hiring me as Acting Bureau
Director, and of course to the current Commission for
making me Bureau Director.

But I wanted to note how

much of a privilege it was to serve under Acting
Chairman Ohlhausen and to reiterate some of the things
she said about the activity of the Commission during
her tenure there.

I think it was a really exciting

and interesting time at the Commission, for obvious
reasons, but also a very and successful one, as she
noted.

Some of the things that we’re going to talk

about today — many of them actually — had their
genesis in that period.
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Also, knowing that Debbie is going to be
moderating, I brought an entire book of things that I
could say in response to the questions I might get.
My first plan was to just read all this out to
everybody, but I decided that wouldn’t be a lot of
fun, so I’m not going to do that.
On coordinated interaction, first of all,
has it ever gone away or is there a resurgence?

I

would say it has never gone away and it’s unclear to
me that there is a resurgence, but certainly it’s an
issue that’s a live issue and something that we think
about quite a lot.
I think as a number of folks here know, and
as Commissioner Ohlhausen mentioned earlier, two days
ago we won a preliminary injunction in a merger case
the primary theory of which was coordinated
interaction.
public.

Now, the decision on that is not yet

It will be coming out.

It is going through

the usual redaction of confidential information
process.

When that decision comes out I think it will
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have some things to say about this topic.
But I would say this on coordinated
interaction.

I think it would be fair to say that

while it’s something that we look at a lot, it’s
probably not alleged as frequently as unilateral
effects in the investigative stage and when we
ultimately go to remedies it’s not as common.
I did some casual empiricism on this.

One

of the things I noted was since 1996 the FTC has
litigated twenty-five preliminary injunctions to
decision, and out of those eight of them involved
coordinated interaction theories.
Out of those twenty-five cases also the
FTC’s win/loss record is eighteen wins and seven
losses.

But its win/loss record in the cases where

coordinated interaction was alleged is five wins and
three losses.

Now, there’s a law of small numbers

problem here, but certainly statistically that shows a
higher loss rate where you’re bringing a coordinated
interaction case.
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When you’re thinking about these theories
that obviously could suggest some cautionary notes
when you’re considering is this a viable case to
challenge; is there a viable theory here that we have
that we could persuade a court to block a merger on?
I think part of the reason for that is there
are some inherent difficulties with coordination — not
so much in terms of the way we think about it
necessarily, but in terms of how the thinking about
coordinated theories might translate to courts.

I’ll

give you three examples of that.
The first is I think some courts struggle
with the distinction between price fixing, an actual
anticompetitive agreement, and coordinated
interaction.

So they tend to sometimes think:

Well,

if the merger isn’t going to allow people to actually
fix prices, if they’re not going to get in a backroom
somewhere and fix prices, then it can’t be a problem.
Whereas I think our view of coordinate
interaction — certainly the Guidelines are clear on
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this — is what we’re concerned about primarily are
cases where that’s exactly what’s not going to happen.
If people do that, if they get in a room and fix
prices, then the Department of Justice is going to go
and put them in jail.

So we’re not as worried about

the conduct that is going to put you in jail.

What

we’re worried about is a merger that is going to allow
you to achieve a similar outcome without doing
something that’s going to put you in jail because
there’s no obvious solution to that problem once you
have allowed it to come into being.
But I think courts struggle sometimes with
price fixing (Sherman Act Section 1) versus Clayton
Act Section 7 coordinated interaction, and they think
if you can’t show the one then you can’t show the
other.
Second, I think courts can struggle with the
complexity of some of the models that are out there
for coordinated interaction.

For example, the kind of

canonical Cournot model which you might use to predict
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coordinated effects produces some results that a court
might find counterintuitive, such as if you run a
basic Cournot model what it will show is that a lot of
mergers are just unprofitable on their face if you
look at variable costs.
So then you can go to the judge and say,
“Well, the model they’re using would say that this
entire merger is unprofitable.
wouldn’t do it.
wrong.”

If that were true we

Therefore, the model has got to be

That’s a challenging thing for a district

court judge to try to figure out.
Third, in cases where you bring a
coordinated interaction theory, you might as a matter
of general assumption believe that those markets are
inherently likely to be less concentrated.

By the

way, that’s not necessarily the case, but certainly
there would be a lot of scenarios where a coordinated
interaction case might involve five-to-four mergers,
those sorts of things, where there’s some reason to
think that the structure of the market will facilitate
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coordination afterwards, but your Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) numbers are going to be lower, and so you
may be further away from the thresholds that have been
established to get presumptions and so forth, and so
there is an inherent challenge from a litigation
standpoint there.
MS. FEINSTEIN:
perspective?

Carles, what’s your

Does coordinated interaction come up a

lot in cases in Europe?
MR. ESTEVA:

I think the term you used

before, resurgence, is a good one to describe the
situation in the European Union.

After the judgment

of the Court in Airtours in 2002 we saw really very
few cases being brought on the basis of coordinated
effects in Europe.
I think probably there are two explanations
for this.

First, the high bar that the judgment set

up for this type of cases.

Also the fact that after

the change of the test in our Regulation in 2004 we
have more flexibility to use unilateral effects to
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look at issues in oligopolistic markets.
In the last few years we have seen a number
of cases being brought on the basis of coordination,
very often on the top of unilateral effects concerns.
This can be explained first by a renewed focus of the
Commission on coordinated effects, but also by the
availability of different types of evidence and in
particular on internal documents.
have reached the Court.

None of these cases

One was abandoned and the

others have been solved by remedies.

But I’m

confident that in all these cases we would have
convinced the Court that the Airtours criteria were
met.
A good example of this type of concerns has
come up in mobile telephony cases.

As Andrea

mentioned, we have been busy challenging a number of
four-to-three mergers in mobile telephony in Europe,
and in some of them on top of unilateral effects we
could establish also coordinated issues.
The Italian case is a good example.
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the merger there would have been a market structure
with three players, three network operators, with very
symmetrical market shares, very symmetrical cost
structures.

The merger would have eliminated the

company that had played more a maverick role in this
area.

On top of this, through internal documents we

could identify that in the past there had been very
clear attempts at coordination on this market and
after the merger these attempts could become much more
successful.
Here the focal point of coordination would
have not been pricing.

In mobile telephony you have

very different pricing offers that make them difficult
to compare.

But, on the contrary, it would have been

easier to coordinate on the basis of the market shares
of the parties.
One last point on this case. This is the
first case in mobile telephony that was resolved with
a structural remedy. Through a divestiture of a number
of assets - spectrum communication towers and
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communication equipment — we facilitated the entry of
a fourth network operator with incentives to behave
quite aggressively in the first years.

Actually, what

we have seen is the entry of Iliad, the fourth player
in France, who had successfully challenged the
incumbent operators in mobile telephony in France.
They announced their launch at the end of May and in
July they had already more than a million subscribers.
I think that this remedy is proving a successful one
to restore competition and maybe even to go further
than the level of competition that we had premerger.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

John, is it your sense that

when advising clients there is good guidance about
when the European Commission is likely to look at
coordinated interaction and what arguments they will
accept in deciding that coordinated actions are
unlikely, or is there some lack of clarity about that
issue?
MR. DAVIES:
difficult question.
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to give a view as a practitioner.
Carles referred to resurgence in cases.

He

kindly didn’t mention one case that he’ll remember we
had a discussion once, which was the AB
InBev/SABMiller global beer merger, where the
Commission identified a risk of tacit collusion.

It

was resolved in Phase I with some extensive remedies.
I recall Carles saying to me what he just said, which
was he was confident that he would be able to find a
resolution if it had to go all the way.

Obviously,

when you’re dealing with one of those cases you have
to make some judgment calls about whether you wish to
challenge that or not.
But I think there is a point there for the
Commission.
of cases.

We’re still talking about a small number
Apart from the beer case, there was a small

number of telecom cases.

I think that the Commission

has to be very thoughtful, particularly when it is
looking at internal documents, because in the
particular matter I was referring to I think that we
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had a somewhat different view as to what the relevance
of those documents were.

We didn’t get the

opportunity to discuss it more carefully.
It’s quite interesting what Bruce said in
his opening comments about in the United States the
relative likelihood of success before a judge in
coordinated cases.
Going back to your question, I think it’s
very difficult to be able to give reliable and
consistent advice to clients, particularly if, for
example, you are not able to assess the documents
beforehand.

Very often, at least in the European

Union, it is very difficult to get your clients to
allow you to review all the documents beforehand so
you can help make a judgment on that particular
aspect.

You may have a better view on the market

conditions which might give rise to coordination.
Personally, as a practicing lawyer, I do
find it very difficult to be able to make reliable
judgments, and I’m hoping that the resurgence is
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limited.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

Howard, at a simplistic

level unilateral effects theory assumes that the
merged firm can raise prices even if nobody else
follows, whereas coordinated interaction assumes that
everybody will raise prices, they’ll be able to work
together.

You sometimes see cases where both theories

are alleged.

Do you think there is conflict and

tension, or can both theories coexist together?
MR. SHELANSKI:

That’s a great question.

I

do not think that there’s a tension necessarily
between a coordinated and a unilateral effects theory.
I think that it will depend very much on the facts and
circumstances, but there are many such cases where
both can very consistently and clearly be raised.
I’ll give you an example.

If you are

looking at a merger between two close competitors in a
differentiated product market, you would naturally
start to think about a unilateral effects theory.

But

lots of things happen in terms of repositioning, how
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you might move the acquired firm’s products closer to
the buying firm’s products, leaving the remaining
firms in a market frankly in a better position to
engage in coordinated interaction amongst themselves
because they may be more closely aligned with each
other in terms of the kinds of products they’re
putting out there in the market, and what was
disrupting their coordination could have been the
acquired firm that in terms of the product space lies
between them and the buying firm.
So what you have is unilateral effects
between the buyer and the target — they’ll raise
price, differentiate maybe even further.

The other

firms are less concerned about the intermediately
located firm disrupting their market and they are in a
better position to have coordinated effects.
You then wind up with a market that has both
unilateral effects and coordinated effects postmerger.

That’s just one of many scenarios one could

come up with.
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I think the 2010 Guidelines made clear that
these were not alternative theories, that these were
theories that could both be brought.

So I don’t think

there’s a necessary tension.
The only other thing I want to add generally
on coordinated effects is I just think historically
it’s sort of remarkable that we’re here asking the
question “Do coordinated effects matter?”

If you just

go back to, say, the period from the mid-1980s to the
mid-1990s, go back to Hospital Corporation of America
and Judge Posner writing that “the sine qua non of all
merger enforcement is collusion and coordinated
effects.”
So what happened?

Why are we now in a

position where coordinated effects theories succeed
less often, seem less front and center, and we more
often bring unilateral effects?

I think that’s a very

interesting story.
I would just note that I think what happened
was intuition ran ahead of theory back in the older

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

18

days; there was a strong intuition that we could
understand collusion.

But then there was a whole lot

of research that showed the conditions under which
collusion can hold are actually relatively slim.

So

we saw coordinated effects going out of fashion.
When they came back into the 2010 Merger
Guidelines, it was a case of theory getting ahead of
intuition.

What we said in the 2010 Guidelines was

tacit collusion is okay; you should think about kinds
of coordination beyond collusion.

That is, as I think

Bruce said, kind of a hard thing for courts to grasp,
it’s kind of counterintuitive, and so we are kind of
at this point now where we are trying to bring back a
more sophisticated form of coordinated effects, and I
think it’s a difficult thing to prove.
MR. HOFFMAN:

Can I add a couple of things

to that?
One, a good example in some ways of the
point that Howard just made coordination, where you
have a unilateral and a coordinated theory, and it has
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to do with repositioning to a certain extent, is
CDK/Auto/Mate.
You had a market there with two very large
competitors and then several smaller competitors.

One

possible issue that could arise is the small
competitor would not only eliminate a nascent rival,
an innovative rival, as Commissioner Olhausen talked
about, but also one that presented a real threat to
the possibility of coordination between the two larger
existing firms.
Another example where you could have these
theories fall out in the same case: If you look at the
complaint in the Tronox case, there are coordinated
effects theories, as I mentioned earlier, and there is
also a unilateral theory having to do with unilateral
capacity reductions.

The intuition behind that is

simply it’s a “have your cake and eat it too” type
scenario, where it’s unilaterally profitable for the
merged firm, under the assumptions and what we
alleged, to reduce its output or to produce less post-
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merger than otherwise the firms would independently.
It would be profitable for the merged firm even if the
other firms responded by increasing their output, but
it would be even more profitable for everybody if they
didn’t, if they chose to withhold output.
things are not inherently in tension.

Those

There is good

reason to think that this can actually happen.
But I also do think this issue about
collusion versus coordination, as I mentioned, is one
the courts have struggled with.
Arch Coal is an example of this.

If you think back,
In Arch Coal I think

the court struggled with this issue.

Also again, as

part of sometimes theory running ahead of maybe at
least the courts if not the facts, in that case the
court said the FTC is pursuing this novel theory that
the firms are going to coordinate on output as opposed
to price.

I just remember reading that and thinking

This is not a novel theory.

In fact, in half of the

price-fixing cases out there is actually coordination
on production because that’s a heck of a lot easier to
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monitor and enforce than price collusion, which is
actually often quite difficult to monitor.
So there are a lot of strange things about
that decision, but I think it underscores that these
kinds of theories are sometimes less intuitively easy
to grasp than the unilateral effects theory, which is
if you have a firm that ends up really large, as is
the case in most of those, people intuitively get the
idea that that could be a problem.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

I also think there might be

something in the fact that the economic tools to
determine whether unilateral effects are likely and
the amount of data we have resulted in the increased
use of unilateral effects theory. For example, you can
now use scanner data to determine what is likely to
happen with retail pricing in a merger.
Often when I was at the Commission and I
would talk to economists, they would say, “Okay, the
theory here is that coordinated interaction is going
to occur because the two companies are now going to
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look more like each other.”
You go, “Okay, great.
that?”

How do I demonstrate

There’s silence in the room because you just

don’t have the same economic tools to show that the
way you do unilateral effects.

I don’t know if others

agree, but I think that may be some of it.
MR. HOFFMAN:

I completely agree with that.

I mentioned earlier that one of the problems is basic
Cournot models and some of the outputs that they
generate when you run them through.
But also, if you think about what is the
model that’s in the Guidelines that talk a lot about
coordinated interaction?

It talks about the plus

factors and so forth and the caselaw on collusion.
And then you look at subsequent developments
on that, and there is literature — Bill Kovacic has
written about it, and Leslie Marx and some others — on
plus factors and super-plus factors and how some of
these plus factors really are almost totally
irrelevant.

Others appear to be highly predictive, or
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at least more or less predictive.

There’s just a lot

of difficulty.
With some of the basic models you run you
get very different outputs for coordination if you
assume differentiated products in Bertrand versus
Cournot, and then when you’re trying to explain that
to a judge it could be really challenging.
MS. FRIEDMAN:

Great.

Let us turn for a minute now to vertical
mergers.

They have certainly been in the news in the

United States, largely because of one case.

There was

a litigated merger this year, which hadn’t happened in
fifty years, where one had actually gone to court.
There had certainly been challenges, mergers that
didn’t occur or where there were consent decrees.

And

certainly vertical merger enforcement is nothing new
at all in the European Commission, and they have put
out quite clear guidelines on the issue.
Howard, are vertical mergers getting more in
the news because there are more of them; and, if so,
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why?

Or is this just a blip because one of them

actually went to court?

What’s your perspective on

that?
MR. SHELANSKI:
things.

I think it is a mix of

I do think that the AT&T/Time Warner case

going to court was a dramatic development because it
was unexpected.

It looked like we were going to run

the playbook of a deal that had happened just seven
years before and that had resulted in elaborate but
fairly routine kind of conduct remedies.

I think

that’s what was expected.
As a theoretical matter about the theories
of harm, there was really nothing terribly novel about
the AT&T/Time Warner case.

One way to look at what

was happening is that the whole litigation was driven
by a new theory of remedy, a theory of what works as
remedies and some experience with previous remedies
that at least some allege might not have worked very
well; and also just an intellectual commitment to not
having antitrust agencies become long-term regulators
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and overseers of a firm or an industry, so a
preference for structural.
When an impasse was reached everybody wound
up in court.

We could say that this was sort of a

one-off or driven not so much by a theory of harm
difference but by a remedial difference, but I do
think there’s something else going on here.
There were certain ways we always used to
look at vertical mergers and certain efficiencies and
benefits of vertical mergers that were really taken as
given.

So the elimination of double marginalization,

which is to say the reduction of a level of profit
taking in the vertical chain that would happen through
the merger was usually taken in every model would
suggest as a good thing.

So the sort of implicit

credit that you would give a vertical merger for
bringing efficiencies was fairly high, and then the
theories of harm — foreclosure, raising rivals’ costs,
and things like that — were fairly hard to prove.

So

against the efficiency motivation and the difficulty
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of showing clear incentive and ability to foreclose,
there wasn’t a lot of incentive to bring cases.
I think that what has happened is there has
been some development in the machinery of analyzing
vertical mergers.

Now we have vertical GUPPI

analysis, upward pricing pressure analyses that are
moved into the vertical context of the kind that Steve
Salop has developed, and bargaining theory, bringing
Nash bargaining theory more to the forefront in
thinking about vertical mergers — not just thinking
about foreclosure, not just thinking about raising
rivals’ costs, but thinking about ways in which the
threat point in a bargaining negotiation between the
acquired firm in the hands of the acquiring firm, or
vice versa, will change after the two are combined.
That was obviously the theory that the
government brought the AT&T/Time Warner case on.
I think that actually is something a little
different than just a remedial motivation; there is
also some shift in the theory.
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in theory or an expansion in the number of theories
that might generate a theory of harm in a case, you
are likely to see more cases.
I actually think that vertical mergers are
going to be — we are not going to see a sea change,
but I think one should not be so presumptively
assuming that these are going to go through.
I would just note when Makan Delrahim before
he was Assistant Attorney General was asked about
AT&T/Time Warner, he said, “Well yeah, it’s vertical.”
But then when he got into the job and was focusing on
the facts and got deep into the investigation, he
began to see something else clearly in authorizing the
case.

So I think that we will see more cases.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

John, one of the debates in

the United States is whether or not we should have
Vertical Merger Guidelines.
1984 Guidelines.

They existed back in the

They have never been updated.

There

have been speeches by enforcers laying out the basic
theories — incentive and ability to foreclose, the
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bargaining model — that explain vertical foreclosure
theory in two or three pages.
The European Commission has obviously gone
further and done much more detailed Guidelines.

Are

the Guidelines useful or do they raise as many
questions as they answer, such that simply saying,
“Here are the three theories that might raise vertical
issues” would give you as much guidance as you think
would be useful in helping advise clients?
MR. DAVIES: I think they have been very
useful.

They certainly set the debate and you have a

clear understanding of the way in which the European
Commission will set about examining a case.
We’re all very familiar with the question of
ability to foreclose, incentive, and then the overall
assessment of effect on competition.
I think in my experience, acting both for
notifying parties in vertical mergers and quite
recently acting for a party bringing a complaint, is
that frankly, notwithstanding the framework, you never
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quite know what the outcome is going to be.

By which

I mean I think it is very difficult for the agency to
come to a conclusion and it is very difficult for the
notifying parties to know how much risk they have.
For me it centers around the question: What
do we mean by foreclosure?

At what point does an

impact on competition become anticompetitive
foreclosure?
So we have the framework, but we still have
a very difficult judgment to make.

I think that’s

probably the reason why in the European Union we see
very often conduct remedies being agreed, particularly
in Phase I merger cases, as a way to resolve the
matter.
I would say that clearly people would think
Conduct remedies are a lot better than divestment.
But in practice, as you indicated, they can be
challenging, complicated to negotiate, particularly if
there is a third party that’s very actively seeking to
protect its position.
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And, of course, they often lead to long-term
monitoring.

We see that in Qualcomm/NXP, where the

Commission sought a range of remedies.

One licensing

remedy would last for eight years.
The last thing I’d say is I think it’s
important to recognize there is in practice a very
important difference between the U.S. approach and the
EU approach.

The European Commission has to make sure

that it can survive an appeal to the court.

The U.S.

agencies don’t have to worry about that in the same
way.

Very often we find ourselves being put to task —

appropriately — by Carles and his colleagues to make
sure that they have the necessary information in the
filing, for example, to clear a case.

So that can be

a very onerous processes.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

Carles, I’ve heard you say

before that the European Commission has a preference
for structural remedies even in vertical cases but you
will take conduct remedies when they are appropriate.
So a couple of questions.
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sense that the conduct remedies you have taken have
been successful and workable?

Is there guidance you

can give on when you might consider a conduct remedy
rather than a structural remedy in a vertical case?
MR. ESTEVA:

Our preference for structural

remedies goes across the board both for horizontal and
vertical cases.

Our practice shows that in a number

of cases with vertical concerns divestitures have been
the best solution, certainly in mergers where we have
vertical and horizontal concerns in the same case.
But also in a number of cases where there was only a
vertical issue that could be solved by a divestiture
without necessarily affecting the rationale or the
efficiencies in the case, then we went for a
divestiture.
But our Guidelines also say that if you have
a conduct or a behavioral remedy that can have the
same effects as a structural one that can be
implemented effectively, properly monitored, and that
will allow another player to remain in the market or

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

32

to enter into the market — that is, that it is not
simply a promise to behave in a certain way by the
merged entities but it will have an impact on the
structure of the market — it can be accepted.
That’s why in a number of vertical cases you
will see that we have solved them via access remedies
or in conglomerate cases via interoperability remedies
that basically achieve the same.
It is important, when looking at these types
of solutions, to examine how the industry is working.
If you see that in the industry in question companies
are already protecting themselves from risks of
foreclosure through long-term contracts, I don’t think
there is any problem with an authority replicating
this either by ensuring that the parties will
renegotiate their existing contracts with companies at
risk of being foreclosed or adding on top of it a
conduct remedy that guarantees access. This is the
strategy that we have followed in a number of cases.
Talking about AT&T, we have also applied
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similar theories of harm in a number of mergers
leading to integration between content and telecoms
providers. A case that we had recently in Belgium,
Telenet/De Vijver, is a good example of this approach.
MS. FEINSTEIN:
perspective?

Bruce, what’s your

I know you said the same thing, that you

prefer structural remedies.

There was a case and the

discussion in the United States about why you used a
conduct remedy in that case, and I’d like you to talk
about that for a minute.

But also I can think of a

number of cases, like Pepsi and Coke buying their
bottlers, where the remedy was to ensure that there
was an appropriate firewall.

Those were not cases

that could have been resolved by divestiture because
the divestiture would have been of the very assets
they were buying.

So are we going to see cases like

that with no remedy, or are we going to see going to
court way, way, way more on vertical cases to deal
with all those cases that in the past have been
remedied by conduct remedies?
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MR. HOFFMAN:

I hate to say “way, way, way

more” because, as I mentioned earlier, we are talking
about relatively small numbers here in the sense that
vertical mergers where we conclude that there is a
competitive problem that needs to be remedied are
still fewer than horizontal mergers where we reach
that conclusion for the reasons that everybody
mentioned earlier.

I spoke about this previously so I

won’t go into great detail on it.
On these larger questions, also I want to
put in a plug for the hearings that we have coming up.
We actually have a hearing on vertical mergers coming
up in the near future, I guess a couple weeks from
now.

We are looking for comments, if people want to

provide comments to us.

I want to underscore that we

are going to take comments very seriously.

We are

really looking for input on all of these questions.
So things may change as we go forward here.

That’s

actually the purpose of having hearings on these
issues.
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But more broadly in terms of vertical
mergers and remedies, I’ve said previously, consistent
with what Carles has said, that we prefer structural
remedies.

That is so for the simple reason that

structural remedies change incentives whereas
behavioral remedies change abilities.
different things.

Those are very

If you change incentives, then you

don’t have to worry anymore about whether people are
going to find some way to act on their incentives —
the incentive is gone.

If you are just imposing

remedies that affect people’s ability to act on their
incentives, then you have to worry perpetually about
whether they will find some way to get around the
remedy you put in place and act on those incentives.
So there is an inherent difference in enforceability.
Having said all that, we had a remedies
study, as you know, and the remedies study looked at,
I think, four vertical merger remedies and concluded
that all of them had actually worked.
We have a recent vertical merger remedy that
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is a behavioral remedy, I guess, that’s nonstructural,
and I guess you could say that provides really good
precedent the next time you have a transaction in
which the customer is the Department of Defense and
the product market is missiles, and beyond that it
probably doesn’t do you a lot of good.

But I think it

does show that in cases where the vertical merger
creates some real benefits, you can’t attain the
benefits with a divestiture, with some kind of
structural remedy, and we have reasonable confidence
that whatever behavioral remedy we put in place would
actually work and be something we could actually do,
we certainly haven’t ruled that out.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

Terrific.

Switching gears just slightly, the European
Commission, John, sometimes talks about conglomerate
effects.

Can you talk about how that differs from

traditional vertical theories and your perspectives on
advising clients about conglomerate effects in Europe?
MR. DAVIES:
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Talking to a large U.S. audience on the
issue of conglomerate effects is a risky venture.
Unfortunately, I drew the short straw.

So please bear

with me.
We’re talking here about mergers between
companies that have complementary products in
neighboring markets where through a range of possible
practices — tying, bundling, or other exclusionary
actions — there can be a material foreclosure effect.
I’ve heard Americans say, “There is no
theory of harm,” and I have to say I disagree with
that.

The EU Guidelines set out what the theory is.

For me the real issue is predictability and how
prepared the agencies are to look further down the
road from an immediate potential efficiency through
bundling, which might reduce prices, to a potential
marginalization of competitors — of course, that’s
what GE/Honeywell was all about — and in my experience
the U.S. agencies are much less willing to look
further down the road, whereas the European Union will
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be prepared to seek to balance out effects over time.
I can say from recent activity U.S.
corporations are very happy to engage with the
European Commission on the conglomerate theory of harm
in relation to other people’s mergers where they can
see that they might be affected over time.

This

predictability issue and the question of standard of
proof in relation to foreclosure is very challenging,
but I don’t accept the idea that there is not a theory
of harm.
A little bit of history.
GE/Honeywell.

I mentioned

Very little happened for a number of

years in the EU arena after that.

Then the 2008

Guidelines set out the theory of harm.

But again,

there was little activity.
James in his introduction mentioned the
expression “portfolio effects” as if that was some
kind of evil spirit that he raised.

But I would say

to you that there has been a resurgence again of EU
activity in this area.
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least half-a-dozen cases in the last couple of years
involving a range of different markets — Dentsply in
relation to dental markets; Worldline/Equens in the
financial markets; a major Phase II case,
Essilor/Luxottica, which was ultimately resolved
without issues but was a major exercise for the
European Commission; and Qualcomm/NXP also had
conglomerate issues in it.
So I would say that there has been a
resurgence.

Indeed, I can quote from the Commission’s

own Competition Merger Brief of July in relation to
Qualcomm, where the Commission said, or at least the
Commission officials who wrote the piece said: “When
reviewing transactions combining complementary
products in highly technological sectors, the
Commission does not shy away from carrying out
conglomerate assessment.

Conglomerate mergers may

warrant careful scrutiny, particularly when the
Parties hold significant market positions in relation
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to complementary products.”1
Now, having said that, I probably need a
bodyguard to be taken out of the room here because I’m
sure that a number of American listeners aren’t so
happy about that.
I would say the issue is alive and well.
For me the challenge for the Commission goes back to
the point I made in relation to vertical mergers: How
do you resolve the issue, and is there a way that you
could possible filter the cases more quickly?
In the United States I know that the
relevant investigating team can very quickly dismiss a
conglomerate issue without any further analysis.

I

don’t think we’ll ever get to that point in the
European Union.
But I do feel that there must be some scope
for avoiding the burden of time and cost that, for
example, parties like Essilor/Luxottica are put
through, where I think the evidence was obtained from

1

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cmb/2018/kdal18001enn.pdf
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4000 retail opticians.

I think there has to be a

means to filter those cases so that there are fewer
situations where companies feel, particularly at the
end of Phase I, that they are obliged to come up with
some kind of remedy, again which is likely to be a
behavioral remedy, in order to be able to move on with
their transaction.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

In the United States I know

that often when companies want to complain about
conglomerate types of theories the agencies will say,
“Look, if there is illegal bundling or illegal tying
come to us after the merger and we can remedy that as
a conduct matter.

We don’t want to block a merger

simply because the company might do that with multiple
products when there’s no real evidence that they
would.”
I can honestly say that I don’t believe I
heard the word “conglomerate” in the four years that I
was at the Agency as a theory that anybody wanted to
pursue.

I don’t know, Howard or Bruce, if you want to
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offer perspectives from your time at the Agency as to
whether or not that was an issue and something that
the United States should be thinking about more.
MR. SHELANSKI:

I’ll pass it to you and then

I can follow up.
MR. HOFFMAN:

Okay.

So I’ve been

volunteered to take the first swing at this from the
U.S. perspective.
I think there’s a couple of things.

First

of all, with respect to pure conglomerate theories, if
you think about product extension or things like that,
we’ve been there and done that.
& Gamble.

We had FTC v. Procter

There’s a history of cases — and this is to

some extent where the United States has the luxury of
having done this for a really long time so we’ve made
every mistake in the book.
We had a series of cases that involved these
theories, which have been roundly pilloried in the
subsequent academic literature as having basically all
been completely wrong.
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then the professors told us we were wrong, and the
courts then said, “We agree with the professors and
you guys were wrong.”

So we didn’t tend to go down

this specific route.
But when you get into what today is called
“conglomerate effects,” I think there’s a couple of
things.
First of all, a lot of what people call
“conglomerate” I would actually call “vertical,” or
even in some cases “horizontal” or “potential
competition” type theories.

We really do look at

those kinds of things.
That then leaves a fairly small bucket of
what you might think of as true conglomerate effects
that really aren’t vertical and really horizontal, and
then the problem that you run into is most of those
actually look like procompetitive benefits.

They tend

to look like the merged firm will be a more efficient
competitor, or it will have a lower cost of capital,
or it will have better efficiencies, or it will have
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better bargaining power as opposed to leverage.

So

there’s a lot of things where it is very difficult ex
ante to say “this is bad versus good” and a lot of the
things that are left look good.
Then that gets to the point, Debbie, that
you made, and to go back to something I said earlier.
One of the things that we think about a lot in merger
enforcement is merger enforcement, particularly when
you are stopping mergers before they have been
consummated, is aimed at preventing firms from getting
into a position where they could cause anticompetitive
harm in a way that it would be very difficult to do
anything about.

Coordinated interaction is not a

Section 1 issue typically, as just one example.
That’s not true for these kinds of theories.
These kinds of theories, as mentioned earlier —
bundling, tying, those sorts of things — if in fact
they are done and in fact they are anticompetitive, we
can reach under Sherman 1, Sherman 2, and the FTC Act.
Also, if you go back and you look at Michael
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Whinston or other literature on this, it’s true that
you could show bundling can be anticompetitive and
tying can be anticompetitive and so forth — that’s
absolutely true — but there have to be a lot of
conditions that have to be met for those things to be
true.
So when you’re looking at it ex ante and
you’re saying, “Okay, do I have real confidence that I
can demonstrate that all the conditions required for
this to be anticompetitive are going to exist at the
point in time when the merged firm will have the
ability to act on it as opposed to these other
potential procompetitive benefits?” — that’s a very
tough call to make ex ante and one that where we do
have tools to do it ex post it is much more
challenging to do.
MR. SHELANSKI:

I’m glad I ducked and let

Debbie’s question hit Bruce because I agree
completely.

I think that was a great answer.

I don’t think I ever heard the term
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“conglomerate effect” or “conglomerate merger” in my
time at the Agency.

That wasn’t a label that people

put on a theory of harm or a reason that we should
investigate.
What you did hear were some of the things
Bruce talked about: potential competition; or that the
product market might change, that what might have been
products that were sold in partial lines would now be
pulled into full lines of complementary products —
getting back to what John was saying about
complementary product mergers.
Now, just for ease of convenience for the
ability to price lower and without great theories yet
in the market — at least when I was at the Agency;
there are some now — but for judges to avail
themselves of to come after the bundlers, there was
some concern that what you were really creating was a
full line as a product and that partial-line
competitors wouldn’t be able to come in against them.
That wasn’t really labeled “conglomerate” at the time.
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Now that we’ve got Dentsply, we’ve got
Cascade/PeaceHealth, we have other ways of thinking
about bundling, I do think you can go after those
cases under Section 1 and Section 2, but I think that
conglomerate effects relabeled might get at a number
of things that we do recognize here in the United
States and that it’s not quite as alien as some make
it out to be.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

And perhaps because of our

system where we have to go into court to prove a case
and where the law on bundling is a bit unclear, I
think probably the parties are more likely to be able
to engage in something that may raise these concerns
where the law is a little unclear and that could be a
reason why you are less likely to see this brought in
the United States than you are in Europe, even if
there is perhaps some concern that the company might
engage in tying or bundling.
Carles, you have been very gracious to come
across the ocean.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

If you’d like to say something on

48

conglomerate mergers you’re welcome to, but I’m not
going to put you on the spot if you don’t want to
engage in the debate and defend the position.
MR. ESTEVA:

Let me react.

I’d like to make

three different points.
First, let me give you some figures on our
enforcement to put this into the proper context.

I

have detailed figures for the last three years,
actually three and a half years because they go until
the end of August of this year. In this period we have
intervened in eighty-six merger cases, in which we
have identified anticompetitive concerns; of these
only in thirteen cases we have raised non-horizontal
issues; and of these five were conglomerate cases,
mergers between complementary products that led to
foreclosure theories. In all of them we applied our
now well established assessment framework, described
in our non-horizontal guidelines from 2008.
What type of issues did these five cases
raise?

Mostly they raised risk of foreclosure through
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what we could call technical tying.

Dentsply/Sirona

is a good example: you have a company that has a very
strong position in dental chairs and is acquiring a
supplier of complementary medical equipment; the risk
is that in the future these dental chairs will not
remain interoperable with other medical equipment.
For these cases an interoperability remedy doesn’t
prevent technical integration; it simply ensures that
the company will maintain the same practice that it
had premerger, that is to allow other competitors to
interoperate.
We could challenge this behavior under
Article 102 ex post, certainly we could, but sometimes
it might be too late to preserve the position of
competitors.

Merger control is there to do an ex ante

analysis and to avoid anticompetitive outcomes.
Second, when we are discussing differences
among us, I think it is always useful not only to look
at substantive law but also at the institutional
system.

John made a comment that I share.
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Probably our most clear institutional
difference is that in the United States agencies go to
court when they want to challenge a merger, but when
they decide not to challenge there is no such judicial
redress, or it is much more complicated; while on our
side every decision that we take, either prohibiting
or clearing, can be appealed.
In the EU there are appeals by third parties
arguing that the Commission did not justify why there
weren't non-horizontal concerns, like in Liberty/Ziggo
where the court concluded the Commission had not
properly justified why one possible foreclosure theory
in one submarket would not arise.

When you are

confronted with this, authorities do not have the
luxury to say, “Well, the evolution in this market is
too uncertain in the future.”

We need to come with

arguments of why the market will evolve in a way that
would lead to foreclosure or non-foreclosure, of the
most likely outcome.

This institutional setting

ensures a balanced approach by the EU authorities and
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can also contribute to explain some of the differences
across the Atlantic.
Third, we need to put these differences into
context. Let me come back to the figures that I
mentioned before.

All the issues that we are

discussing at this panel are at the margins of
enforcement. At the EU we had four cases on
coordinated effects, thirteen cases of non-horizontal
concerns, but the bulk of our enforcement on both
sides of the Atlantic is on unilateral aspects, on
short-term impact on prices, on ensuring that we have
remedies that eliminate these concerns.
The fact that this panel doesn’t feel the
need to discuss all these issues shows that on most of
the fronts we have a broad consensus.

The message

today I don’t think should be that we have a
disagreement on conglomerate issues but rather that
there is so much agreement on all the rest that we
don’t even feel the need to discuss it.
MR. HOFFMAN:
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number is 5.8 percent of your enforcement actions
involve conglomerate — that’s pretty small — and 94.2
percent didn’t.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

But these are the issues

that often get discussed in board rooms and elsewhere
-- whether or not there is convergence or divergence.
Speaking about another term that hasn’t come
up as much in the past but has suddenly been discussed
a lot, particularly in the popular press is monopsony,
particularly in labor markets but more generally.
Bruce, I wonder if you could start us off by
describing monopsony and explaining the debate between
whether or not it is the symmetrical opposite of
monopoly.
MR. HOFFMAN:

This is a pet topic of mine so

I’m going to have to restrain myself from going on
indefinitely here, as you know.

We talked about this

a few times.
Monopsony involves the exercise of buying
power, market power by a buyer that results in an
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output reduction so the buyer purchases less than the
socially optimal or the economically optimal output
from its upstream suppliers.

That’s a complicated way

of describing it, but it’s actually really important
for a reason I’ll get back to in a second, because
there’s a huge confusion in the popular press about
what is monopsony versus what is buyer power.
Legally I think it’s quite clear that
monopoly and monopsony are symmetrical.

The caselaw

and the Guidelines actually are quite clear that there
is no distinction in how the courts or how the
enforcement agencies view the legality of conduct or
transactions that result in monopsony versus monopoly
power.
Now, I don’t think that’s actually
necessarily true from an economic standpoint.

There

are a couple of differences between monopoly and
monopsony that could have implications for how you
actually would allege a case, for example, of what you
might look for.
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One is monopoly cases involve the demand
curve primarily, and we think and there is good reason
to believe that demand curves are virtually always
downward-sloping, with the exception of Giffen goods
or Veblen goods, which are really outliers and not
really material for the purposes of most enforcement
decisions.

I can talk about those things if people

really want to get into it, but I’ll skip it for now,
unless somebody has a desire to delve into really
arcane things.
In order for monopsony to exist — there’s a
bargaining theory of monopsony that doesn’t require
this condition; it’s a little more complicated — but
in the standard monopsony theory you have to assume
that supply curves are upward-sloping.

We don’t know

as a matter of theory or empirics whether that is as
uniformly true as is the case with demand curves.
There’s a number of supply curves that you
might think would be flat.

There’s some that could be

downward-sloping — for example, where you have returns
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of scale or efficiencies, lower cost of production,
you actually might have a downward-sloping supply
curve.

Labor supply curves are arguably U-shaped.

So

the theoretical framework in economics for treating
monopoly and monopsony as symmetrical is not as robust
as the legal framework is.
Having said all that, I think it’s certainly
the case that this is an issue that we are thinking
about a lot.
One other point that I wanted to touch on in
the popular press is there is a confusion between
buyer power and monopsony power, but I think it’s
actually relatively easy to resolve.

The popular

press hasn’t done this, but it’s easy to resolve if
you think about it this way.

When you have a concern

about a possible exercise of buyer power, the critical
question or the first question you can ask is: What
are the suppliers going to do?
When the buyer exercises his power,
typically in the first instance by reducing the price
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it is going to pay, then you say: Will supplier A say,
“That price isn’t very good so I’m going to actually
produce less because it’s not worth it to me to
continue producing as much as I’m producing; or am I
going to produce more because I want to get that
revenue back, and so in order to get the same amount
of revenue I’m just going to increase my output?”
If the answer is you are going to produce
more, then you probably have a procompetitive, or at
least neutral, situation where, for example,
effectively the buyer’s price cut might really be the
equivalent of volume discounts; or it could be
offsetting existing market power on the supplier side.
There has been some empirical work on
insurance mergers, for example, where the post-merger
insurance company reduced price for healthcare
providers — this is health insurance — and the
response of the providers was typically to increase
their output, which suggests that in those cases there
was preexisting market power by the healthcare
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providers that the merged insurance company offset.
On the other hand, if the suppliers cut
their production, if it becomes not valuable enough
for them to make those next units under the new
pricing conditions, then you have a monopsony problem,
and there is no reason why we wouldn’t try to deal
with that.
Now, as a practical matter — I don’t think
this is a necessary condition but it’s a very common
condition — in order for there to be demonstrable harm
from monopsony you also typically have power on the
sell side, so the firm with the monopsony power also
has some measure of monopoly or market power.

In a

lot of our cases what has happened is we have
determined that we can remedy that and by doing so we
also fix the problem on the buy side.
You could question — and I have questioned
and others have questioned — how true that always is,
but certainly that has been the case in a lot of our
thinking about this in the past.
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MS. FEINSTEIN:

Carles and John, do you see

monopsony cases in Europe and do you have a sense of
why not if you don’t?
MR. ESTEVA:

This is an area where we have

very limited case law and very little practice.

It is

area where European merger law can still evolve.
There is no doubt that the Merger Regulation
would allow us also to look at the impact of mergers
on the upstream markets if the merger leads to the
creation of a monopsony.

Where there is less

certainty is under which conditions the Commission
should intervene.
We have looked at this issue in a number of
cases normally affecting mergers between supermarkets.
We have never concluded that these mergers would have
led to sufficient market power upstream to be
concerned.
We had recently an interesting case
concerning a merger of slaughterhouses in Ireland. The
market downstream is the sale of meat across Ireland,
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while the market upstream is basically the acquisition
of live cattle in narrower geographical areas. The
concern was: would this entity after the merger be
able to lower prices to acquire cattle?
We concluded that even if the merger entity
would have a quite important market share on the
acquisition of cattle, around 40 percent, it would not
be able to lower prices because other slaughterhouses
remain there with excess capacity that could be used
to acquire.
But if we had found that they could lower
prices, would that be enough to intervene?

I think

the general wisdom in Europe is that probably this is
not enough, that it’s not enough to say simply because
prices upstream will be lower you have a competition
concern.
We would probably need to establish that
this price reduction would have an impact on the
market in a way that output would be reduced and
finally customers would be harmed.
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But I say all this with all the safeguards
needed because we have never had to establish this in
a case and we have never gone to court on this matter.
MR. SHELANSKI:
this discussion.

I don’t have a lot to add to

I would just note that I think the

key distinction that drives why there was not much
attention in the popular press in the 1980s and why
there might be attention now is the distinction
between buyer power and monopsony.
I think a lot of what we hear about —
particularly with regard to wages, as you mentioned,
Debbie — is about buyer power and reallocation of
surplus from workers to the owners of capital.

It is

not about inefficient reduction of supply under the
traditional monopsony kind of model.

So I think it

taps into a lot of things that have a lot greater
resonance to people than the fact that supply curves
are presumed upward-sloping and if you price too low
people won’t find it profitable to produce the next
increment so they won’t.
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We haven’t seen a lot of monopsony cases
over the past century for a good reason.

That’s very

often a self-correcting kind of situation because as a
buyer of that output you don’t want to sub-optimally
consume what you need, especially if it’s an input
market — and this often comes up in agriculture — so
you are going to raise your price just to the level
that you need to to get that level of output.
The antitrust authorities look at this and
say, “Well, this is great.

This is just squeezing

down costs, which expands ultimate product output to
consumers.

This is a good thing.”

So monopsony has a redistributive effect
that comes through some of the efficiencies that often
prevent us us from bringing monopsony cases.

So it’s

really bargaining power that I think is driving a lot
of the current debate.
It’s a very important topic.

Whether it’s

an antitrust topic I think is a harder question.
MS. FEINSTEIN:
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really important point. At another conference there
was an interesting discussion about is it enough just
to have the condition of monopsony or is it selfcorrecting?
Most of the lawyers in the room said: “The
way we think about the caselaw and the consumer
welfare effect, we have to show not just that they
would have few enough buyers that they could extract
this; we have to show the next couple of steps, that
in fact there would be reduced output as a result and
prices to consumers would end up going up; otherwise
all it’s doing is lowering cost.

And it’s something

that the buyers can control so why should we worry
about this?”
There were a number of economists in the
room that were adamant it should be exactly
symmetrical and that simply if you can show that the
conditions for monopoly exist because of a merger or
the conditions of oligopoly, that the reverse ought to
be true: simply the conditions of monopsony, the
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conditions of oligopsony, that you shouldn’t have to
take those next two steps.
It will be interesting to see if there is
the right kind of case that allows this to play out.
I think we are nearing the end of our time.
Unless anybody really wants to talk about common
ownership, I think I might turn it over to the
audience and ask both if there are questions.

And if

the enforcers from any of the other countries want to
weigh in with respect to perspectives from their
jurisdiction, we would also welcome that.

I open the

floor up.
QUESTION [off-mic] [James Keyte, Fordham]: I
have one for Bruce because it sounds like this is one
of your pet areas for monopsony.
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]:

Bruce, in

terms of a monopsony situation where you have a more
competitive downstream market, is it your position
that you would still have to show an effect on
ultimate consumers, even where there is a monopsony
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effect upstream?
MR. HOFFMAN: I don’t know what a court would
say about that.

I think that’s an issue that’s kind

of out there waiting to be addressed.
One thing I would say about that is if you
truly have a monopsony, then even assuming the
downstream market is competitive — and you’re not
going to be able to show the sort of standard “Okay,
I’ve got a monopsony on one side, a monopoly on the
other, and I’m going to suppress output and suppress
input,” which is the easy case — but assuming you
don’t have that, nevertheless one of the effects that
can occur in that kind of scenario — or take the
slaughterhouse type scenario where you have the
slaughterhouses but then the downstream market is the
sale of beef; that’s more competitive — nevertheless
you could assume that in most situations where that
would occur the result would be that while there would
be no reduction in output overall, the output would
move to a less-efficient configuration because ex ante
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the configuration would by assumption be the moreefficient one; otherwise it wouldn’t exist.
So there is a net efficiency loss in that
scenario, and from my way of thinking about things, if
that’s the case, I’m not worried about a false
positive; I would consider bringing that case.

If a

court were then to say, “Well, you haven’t been able
to show enough downstream harm, then so be it, but the
economics of that are I think fairly unambiguously
harmful.
QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]: And does
that go to the debate of whether it’s consumer
welfare, total welfare [inaudible]?
MR. HOFFMAN:

Well, there’s consumer welfare

loss there; it’s just that it’s very, very difficult
to quantify.

In the monopoly context it’s easier.

But in the scenario that I described you’ve got an
inefficiency problem where I’ve now substituted a
less-efficient input, so presumably that is going to
cause an effect where everyone is worse off.
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I’m not an economist at all; I just play
around with this stuff and stay in — what is the old
saying, “I slept at a Holiday Inn Express last night?”
— so I hesitate to go too far down the road of
addressing the total welfare-versus-consumer welfare
framework in terms of how you would characterize that.
But to me there is both a net loss and you
would assume that some of that at least would be
translated to the consumer level.

I just think it’s

hard to quantify than is the case with the more
classical “I have a monopsony problem and I have
market power downstream.”

That one is easier.

QUESTIONER [off-mic] [Mr. Keyte]: That will
be an interesting case.
MR. HOFFMAN:

Those are the best ones.

QUESTION [Michael Stein]:

Speaking of

things that are difficult to quantify from a harm
perspective but might also be in the press a bit soon,
do you think there has been any movement on predatory
pricing?

Is that something we can see a renewed
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interest in?
MR. HOFFMAN:

Was that to me or is that to

Carles?
QUESTIONER [Mr. Stein]:
MR. ESTEVA:

To anyone.

Can you repeat the question?

QUESTIONER [Mr. Stein]:

Really the question

is about predatory pricing, like the idea of pricing
so low that you drive competitors out of business.

Up

to a very fine line it’s generally pretty
procompetitive.

It is a topic that has been in the

press lately here.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

We have a Supreme Court case

that lays out pretty clearly what the standards are
for predatory pricing cases.

I think that’s the way

the agencies and private plaintiffs will think about
it.

I don’t think there’s a lot of room for change

there any time soon.
MR. HOFFMAN:
MR. ESTEVA:

I agree.
We have also a pretty clear

legal situation in Europe on this.
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QUESTION [Pallavi Guniganti]:

I have a

question following up on the comments from the head of
the French Competition Authority yesterday about the
incoming legislation in France for agricultural
producers and their interactions with food retailers.
With the concern that was shown by the
legislature there about how forcing down prices on
food producers was potentially hurting quality — and
that’s presumably from a competition aspect also a
relevant part of consumer welfare — I was curious as
to how that is seen with the monopsony situation.
MR. HOFFMAN:

What I would say about that is

when we say “price” we mean that as a shorthand for
price/quality/output.

We would certainly be concerned

about a monopsony case where the exercise of monopsony
power took the form of driving down quality.

That’s

the case as well on the other side when we’re looking
at standard monopoly-type or selling-side cases where
we try to look at quality.
It’s inherently harder to measure so there
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are more challenging issues that arise when you are
trying to assess those kinds of effects.

But we

certainly would be open to that.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

And I think it raises the

same questions that Howard raised, which is if you’re
the purchaser are you going to pay so little that you
are going to drive down the quality; and, if so, why
would you do so?

And, if there was then room for

somebody with a higher-quality product, are the
conditions for entry such that they couldn’t enter,
and say: “Wait a minute.

There are people who are

paying less but they’re getting a really bad product.
Why don’t I basically come in with a slightly higher
priced product but with better quality, if there in
fact is a market for that?”
MR. SHELANSKI:

I agree with this, although

I think there is an important caveat, which is it’s
not just that quality is harder to measure; very
closely related to that is that it can be harder to
observe.

There are things that are done in the
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production process that reduce quality, reduce
healthfulness.

This is part of the legislative

concern that we have seen in a number of
jurisdictions.
That’s not going to be observable by
consumers.

They are going to pay their price, they

are going to get whatever the product is that they’re
getting, and they may not know that there are things
that have gone into the production of that product
that are less healthy, that actually do reduce the
quality, in ways that are hard to observe or that are
observable only after a very long term.
So what you get there is an effort to
correct what is a potential market failure in the
inability to let price be a sufficient statistic for
everything that you want to know about what you are
consuming.

There is a very coherent theory behind

doing that kind of legislation.
The only important thing to recognize is,
though, if the market structure is static and you give
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that larger payment to the people who are producing,
why would they not still take the same shortcuts if
the quality is unobservable?
that has to be answered.

That’s the hard question

It has to be coupled with

some kind of quality monitoring.
MR. DAVIES:

If I could just add, I think in

the agricultural area that would just open an
extraordinary Pandora’s Box in terms of assessing
quality.

I imagine a number of agency heads in the

room would not particularly welcome that task.

I

certainly wouldn’t welcome it from the other side of
the table.
QUESTION [Cecile Lohrs]: Thanks very much
for coming and taking my question.
I attended the Time Warner trial every day.
I thought it was really interesting that DOJ’s
economist acknowledged that there would be no
foreclosure after the merger happened.

The whole

theory of harm was based on the fact that there would
be a slight increase in leverage, in bargaining, on
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the Time Warner side, but they have never gone dark in
the past with any of the companies who they negotiate
with.
I’m wondering what kind of proof you might
need to make such a big jump from foreclosure always
being the problem to being now the problem is this
amorphous bargaining leverage issue.

You’re wrinkling

your forehead, Bruce.
MR. HOFFMAN:
amorphous.

I don’t think it’s very

I think the bargaining theories are very

clear.
Think about it this way.

You don’t have to

have a war for the threat of war to have an effect,
right?
QUESTIONER [Ms. Lohrs]: Absolutely.
MR. HOFFMAN:

And so when you look at

bargaining leverage models, what those models do is
they say: Okay, how do the payoffs to the two sides
change based on the outcome if everything goes bad?
It is obviously going to be in the parties’

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

73

interest to not have everything go bad, because then
everybody suffers and the only question is who suffers
worse.
When a merger changes that dynamic, then you
have a very predictable — it’s harder to show what the
actual effect is going to be, but directionally you’ve
got a very predictable change in the likely outcomes.
I don’t think there’s anything
controversial, or even particularly novel, at this
point.

Ten years ago maybe this was a little more

novel, but today to treat this as novel or something
unprecedented or say that actual total breakdowns of
bargaining are a necessary condition for this theory
to be valid I think is just not correct.
QUESTIONER [Ms. Lohrs]:
evidence do you actually need?

So what kind of

Clearly I’m not the

judge, but I was there and I was listening.

I’m

wondering about what kind of evidence you would
actually need.
MR. HOFFMAN:
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case and I don’t want to speak for their cases.
But what I would say is what you look for is
how do the different participants in the bargaining
view the outcome if things go wrong and how do they
think about the likely change.

There are mathematical

tools you can apply to that, but also you can look at
what has happened in the past, what documents show,
and those sorts of things.

I think showing that the

transaction is going to change those payoffs and is
going to change bargaining leverage is and should be
enough.
Of course it is helpful if you can show that
at times in the past things have broken down, but I
don’t think it’s necessary.
MS. FEINSTEIN:

On that note, I want to

thank the panelists for a great discussion.
join me in thanking them.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you very much.

[Break: 12:15 p.m.]
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